CPU caches introduce variations into the execution time of programs that can be exploited by adversaries to recover private information about users or cryptographic keys.
Introduction
CPU caches reduce the latency of memory accesses on average, but not in the worst case. Thus, they introduce variations into the execution time of programs, which can be exploited by adversaries to recover secrets, such as private information about users or cryptographic keys [1, 8, 23, 39, 41, 47] .
A large number of techniques have been proposed to counter this threat. Some proposals work at the level of the operating system [19, 27, 50] , others at the level of the hardware architecture [22, 44, 45] or the cryptographic protocol [17] . In practice, however, software countermeasures are often the preferred choice because they can be easily deployed.
A common software countermeasure is to ensure that control flow, memory accesses, and execution time of individual instructions do not depend on secret data [9, 31] . While such code prevents leaks through instruction and data caches, hiding all dependencies can come with performance penalties [12] .
More permissive countermeasures are to ensure that both branches of each conditional fit into a single line of the instruction cache, to preload lookup tables, or to permit secret-dependent memory access patterns as long as they are secret-independent at the granularity of cache lines or sets. Such permissive code can be faster and is widely deployed in crypto-libraries such as OpenSSL. However, analyzing its security requires intricate reasoning about the interactions of the program and the hardware platform and has so far only been done for restricted cases [16] .
A major hurdle for reasoning about these interactions are the requirements put on tracking memory addresses: On the one hand, static analysis of code with dynamic memory allocation requires memory addresses to be dealt with symbolically. On the other hand, analysis of cache-aligned memory layout requires support for accurately tracking the effect of bit-level and arithmetic operations. While there are solutions that address each of these requirements in isolation, supporting them together is challenging, because the demand for symbolic treatment conflicts with the demand for bit-level precision.
In this paper, we propose novel techniques that meet both requirements and thus enable the automated security analysis of permissive software countermeasures against microarchitectural side-channel attacks in executable code.
proximating the semantics of programs [14] . We moreover introduce a DAG-based abstract domain to represent sets of traces of masked symbols.
Adversary Models Our novel abstract domains enable us to reason about the security of programs against a wide range of microarchitectural side channel adversaries, most of which are out of the scope of existing approaches. The key observation is that the capability of these adversaries to observe a victim's execution can be captured in terms of projections to some of the bits of the addresses accessed by the victim. This modeling encompasses adversaries that can see the full trace of accesses to the instruction cache (commonly known as the program counter security model [36] ), but also weaker ones that can see only the trace of memory pages, blocks, or cache banks, with respect to data, instruction, or shared caches.
Bounding Leaks We use our abstract domains for deriving upper bounds on the amount of information that a program leaks. We achieve this by counting the number of observations each of these adversaries can make during program execution, as in [30, 33, 38] . In this paper we perform the counting by applying an adversary-specific projection to the set of masked symbols corresponding to each memory access. We highlight two features of this approach:
• The projection may collapse a multi-element set to a singleton set, for example, in the case of different addresses mapping to the same memory block. This is the key for establishing that some memory accesses do not leak information to some observers, even if they depend on secret data.
• As the projection operates on individual bits, we can compute the adversary's observations on addresses that contain both known and unknown bits. In this way, our counting effectively captures the leak of the program, rather than the uncertainty about the address of the dynamically allocated memory.
Implementation and Evaluation
We implement our novel techniques on top of the CacheAudit static binary analyzer [16] , and we evaluate their effectiveness in a case study where we perform the first formal analysis of commonly used software countermeasures for protecting modular exponentiation algorithms. The paper contains a detailed description of our case study; here we highlight the following results:
• We analyze the security of the scatter/gather countermeasure used in OpenSSL 1.0.2f for protecting windowbased modular exponentiation. Scatter/gather ensures that the pattern of data cache accesses is secret-independent at the level of granularity of cache lines and, indeed, our analysis of the binary executable reports security against adversaries that can monitor only cache line accesses.
• Our analysis of the scatter/gather countermeasure reports a leak with respect to adversaries that can monitor memory accesses at a more fine-grained resolution. This leak has been exploited in the CacheBleed attack [48] , where the adversary observes accesses to the individual banks within a cache line. We analyze the variant of scatter/gather published in OpenSSL 1.0.2g as a response to the attack and prove its security with respect to powerful adversaries that can monitor the full address trace.
• Our analysis detects the side channel in the square-andmultiply algorithm in libgcrypt 1.5.2 that has been exploited in [32, 47] , but can prove the absence of an instruction cache leak in the square-and-always-multiply algorithm used in libgcrypt 1.5.3, for some compiler optimization levels.
Overall, our results illustrate (once again) the dependency of software countermeasures against cache attacks on brittle details of the compilation and the hardware architecture, and they demonstrate (for the first time) how automated program analysis can effectively support the rigorous analysis of permissive software countermeasures.
In summary, our contributions are to devise novel techniques that enable cache-aware reasoning about dynamically allocated memory, and to put these techniques to work in the first rigorous analysis of widely deployed permissive countermeasures against cache side channel attacks.
Illustrative Example
We illustrate the scope of the techniques developed in this paper using a problem that arises in implementations of windowed modular exponentiation. There, powers of the base are pre-computed and stored in a table for future lookup. Figure 1 shows an example memory layout of two such precomputed values p 2 and p 3 , each of 3072 bits, which are stored in heap memory. An adversary that observes accesses to the six memory blocks starting at 80eb140 knows that p 2 was requested, which can give rise to effective key-recovery attacks [32] .
Figure 1:
Layout of pre-computed values in main memory, for the windowed modular exponentiation implementation from libgcrypt 1.6.1. Black lines denote the memory block boundaries, for an architecture with blocks of 64 bytes.
Defensive approaches for table lookup, as implemented in NaCl or libgcrypt 1.6.3, avoid such vulnerabilities by accessing all table entries in a constant order. OpenSSL 1.0.2f instead uses a more permissive approach that accesses only one table entry, however it uses a smart layout of the tables to ensure that the memory blocks are loaded into the cache in a constant order. An example layout for storing 8 precomputed values is shown in Figure 2 . The code that man- Figure 2 : Layout of pre-computed values in main memory, achieved with the scatter/gather countermeasure. Data highlighted in different colors correspond to pre-computed values p 0 , . . . , p 7 , respectively. Black lines denote the memory block boundaries, for an architecture with blocks of 64 bytes.
ages such tables consists of three functions, which are given in Figure 3 .
• To create the layout, the function align aligns a buffer with the memory block boundary by ensuring the leastsignificant bits of the buffer address are zeroed.
• To write a value into the array, the function scatter ensures that the bytes of the pre-computed values are stored spacing bytes apart.
• Finally, to retrieve a pre-computed value from the buffer, the function gather assembles the value by accessing its bytes in the same order they were stored. The techniques developed in this paper enable automatic reasoning about the effectiveness of such countermeasures, for a variety of adversaries. Our analysis handles the dynamically-allocated address in buf from Figure 3 symbolically, but is still able to establish the effect of align by considering bit-level semantics of arithmetic operators on symbols: First, the analysis establishes that buf & (block size -1) clears the most-significant bits of the symbol s; second, when subtracting this value from buf, the analysis determines that the result is s, with the least-significant bits cleared; third, the analysis determines that adding block size leaves the least-significant bits unchanged, but affects the unknown bits, resulting in a new symbolic address s ′ = s whose least significant bits are cleared.
Using this information, in gather, our analysis establishes that, independently from the value of k, at each iteration of the loop, the most-significant bits of the accessed location are the same. Combining this information with knowledge about the architecture such as the block size, the analysis establishes that the sequence of accessed memory blocks is the same, thus the countermeasure ensures security of scatter/gather with respect to adversary who makes observations at memory-block granularity.
Memory Trace Adversaries
In this section we formally define a family of side channel adversaries that exploit features of the microarchitecture, in particular: caches. The difference between these adversaries is the granularity at which they can observe the trace of programs' accesses to main memory. We start by introducing an abstract notion of programs and traces.
Programs and Traces
We introduce an abstract notion of programs as the transformations of the main memory and CPU register contents (which we collectively call the machine state), caused by the execution of the program's instructions. Formally, a program P = (Σ, I, A, R) consists of the following components:
• Σ -a set of states • I ⊆ Σ -a set of possible initial states • A -a set of addresses • R ⊆ Σ × A * × Σ -a transition relation A transition (σ i , a, σ j ) ∈ R captures two aspects of a computation step: first, it describes how the instruction set semantics operates on data stored in the machine state, namely by updating σ i to σ j ; second, it describes the sequence of memory accesses a ∈ A * issued during this update, which includes the addresses accessed when fetching instructions from the code segment, as well as the addresses containing accessed data. To capture the effect of one computation step in presence of uncertain inputs, we define the next operator:
A trace of P is an alternating sequence of states and addresses σ 0 a 0 σ 1 a 1 . . . σ k such that σ 0 ∈ I, and that for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, (σ i , a i , σ i+1 ) ∈ R. The set of all traces of P is its collecting semantics Col ⊆ Traces. In this paper, we only consider terminating programs, and define their collecting semantics as the least fixpoint of the next operator containing I: Col = I ∪ next(I) ∪ next 2 (I) ∪ . . . .
A Hierarchy of Memory Trace Observers
Today's CPUs commonly partition the memory space into units of different sizes, corresponding to virtual memory pages, cache lines, or cache banks. The delays introduced by page faults, cache misses, or bank conflicts enable realworld adversaries to effectively identify the units involved in another program's memory accesses. We explicitly model this capability by defining adversaries that can observe memory accesses at the granularity of each unit, but that cannot distinguish between accesses to positions within the same unit.
Observing a Memory Access On a common n-bit architecture, the most significant n − b bits of each address serve as an identifier for the unit containing the addressed data, and the least significant b bits serve as the offset of the data within that unit, where 2 b is the byte-size of the respective unit.
We formally capture the capability to observe units of size 2 b by projecting addresses to their n − b most significant bits, effectively making the b least significant bits invisible to the adversary. That is, when accessing the n-bit address a = (x n−1 , x n−2 , . . . , x 0 ), the adversary observes
Example 1. A 32-bit architecture with 4KB pages, 64B cache lines, and 4B cache banks will use bits 0 to 11 for offsets within a page, 0 to 5 for offsets within a cache line, and 0 to 1 for offsets within a cache bank. That is, the corresponding adversaries observe bits 12 to 31, 6 to 31, and 2 to 31, respectively, of each memory access.
Observing Program Executions We now lift the capability to observe individual memory accesses to full program executions. This lifting is formalized in terms of views, which are functions that map traces in Col to sequences of projections of memory accesses to observable units. Formally, the view of an adversary on a trace of the program is defined by
By considering π n:b for different values of b, we obtain a hierarchy of memory trace observers:
• The address-trace observer corresponds to b = 0; it can observe the full sequence a 0 a 1 . . . a k−1 of memory locations that are accessed. Security against this adversary implies resilience to many kinds of microarchitectural side channels, through cache, TLB, DRAM, and branch prediction buffer. 1 An address-trace observer restricted to instruction-addresses is equivalent to the program counter security model [36] .
• The block-trace observer can observe the sequence of memory blocks loaded into cache lines. Blocks are com-monly of size 32, 64, or 128 bytes, i.e. b = 5, 6, or 7. Security against this adversary implies resilience against adversaries that can monitor memory accesses at the level of granularity of cache lines. Most known cache-based attacks exploit observations at the granularity of cache lines, e.g. [32, 40, 49] .
• The bank-trace observer can observe a sequence of accessed cache banks, a technology used in some CPUs for hyperthreading. An example of an attack at the granularity of cache banks is CacheBleed [48] against the scatter/gather implementation from OpenSSL 1.0.2f. The platform targeted in this attack has 16 banks of size 4 bytes, i.e. b = 2.
• The page-trace observer can observe memory accesses at the granularity of accessed memory pages, which are commonly of size 4096 bytes, i.e. b = 12. Examples of such attacks appear in [46] and [42] . We denote the views of these observers by view address , view block , view bank , and view page , respectively.
Observations Modulo Stuttering For each of the observers defined above we also consider a variant that cannot distinguish between repeated accesses to the same unit (which we call stuttering). This is motivated by the fact that the latency of cache misses dwarfs that of cache hits and is hence easier to observe.
For the observer view block , we formalize this variant in terms of a function view b-block taking as input a blocksequence w and replacing the maximal subsequences B · · · B of each block B in w by the single block B. E.g., view b-block maps both AABCDDC and ABBBCCDDCC to the sequence ABCDC, making them indistinguishable to the adversary. This captures an adversary that cannot count the number of memory accesses, as long as they are guaranteed to be cache hits 2 .
Static Quantification of Leaks
In this section, we characterize the amount of information leaked by a program, and we show how this amount can be over-approximated by static analysis. While the basic idea is standard (we rely on upper bounds on the cardinality of an adversary's view), our presentation exhibits a new path for performing such an analysis in the presence of low inputs. In this section we outline the basic idea, which we instantiate in Sections 5 and 6 for the observers defined in Section 3.
Quantifying Leaks As is common in information-flow analysis, we quantify the amount of information leaked by a program about its secret (or high) inputs in terms of the maximum number of observations an adversary can make, for any valuation of the public (or low) input [29, 33, 43] .
To reflect the distinction between high and low inputs in the semantics, we split the initial state into a low part I lo and a high part I hi , i.e., I = I lo × I hi . We split the collecting semantics into a family of collecting semantics
Formally, we define leakage as the maximum cardinality of the adversary's view w.r.t. all possible low inputs:
The logarithm of this number corresponds to the number of leaked bits, and it comes with different interpretations in terms of security. For example, it can be related to a lower bound on the expected number of guesses an adversary has to make for successfully recovering the secret input [34] , or to an upper bound on the probability of successfully guessing the secret input in one shot [43] . Note that a leakage L of 1 (i.e. 0 bits) corresponds to non-interference.
Static Bounds on Leaks For quantifying leakage based on Equation 1
, one needs to determine the size of the range of view applied to the fixpoint Col λ of the next operator, for all λ ∈ I lo -which is infeasible for most programs.
For fixed values λ ∈ I lo , however, the fixpoint computation can be tractably approximated by abstract interpretation [14] . The result is a so-called abstract fixpoint Col ♯ that represents a superset of Col λ , based on which one can over-approximate the range of view [30] . One possibility to obtain bounds for the leakage that hold for all low values is to compute one fixpoint w.r.t. all possible I lo rather than one for each single λ ∈ I lo [16] . The problem with this approach is that possible variation in low inputs is reflected in the leakage, which can lead to imprecision.
Secret vs Public, Known vs Unknown Inputs
The key to our treatment of low inputs is that we classify variables along two dimensions.
• The first dimension is whether variables carry secret (or high) or public (or low) data. High variables are represented in terms of the set of all possible values the variables can take, where larger sets represent more uncertainty about the values of the variable. Low data is represented in terms of a singleton set.
• The second dimension is whether variables represent values that are known at analysis time or not. Known values are represented by constants whereas unknown values are represented as symbols.
Example 2. The set {1, 2} represents a high variable that carries one of two known values. The set {s} represents a low variable that carries a value s that is not known at analysis time. The set {1} represents a low variable with known value 1. Combinations such as {1, s} are possible; this example represents a high variable, one of its possible values is unknown at analysis time.
While existing quantitative information-flow analyses that consider low inputs rely on explicit tracking of path relations [7, 13] , our modeling allows us to identify -and factor out -variations in observable outputs due to low inputs even in simple, set-based abstractions. This enables us to compute fixpoints Col ♯ (s) containing symbols, based on techniques that are known to work on intricate low-level code, such as cryptographic libraries [16] . The following example illustrates this advantage.
Example 3. Consider the following program, where variable x is initially assigned a pointer to a dynamically allocated memory region. We assume that the pointer is low but unknown, which we model by x = {s}, for some symbol s. Depending on a secret bit h ∈ {0, 1} this pointer is increased by 64 or not. For an observer who can see the value of x after termination, our analysis will determine that leakage is bounded by L ≤ |{s, s + 64}| = 2. This bound holds for any value that s may take in the initial state λ, effectively separating uncertainty about low inputs from uncertainty about high inputs.
In this paper we use low input to model dynamically allocated memory locations, as in Example 3. That is, we rely on the assumption that locations chosen by the allocator do not depend on secret data. More precisely, we assume that the initial state contains a pool of low but unknown heap locations that can be dynamically requested by the program.
Masked Symbol Abstract Domain
Cache-aware code often uses Boolean and arithmetic operations on pointers in order to achieve favorable memory alignment. In this section we devise the masked symbol domain, which is an abstract domain that enables the static analysis of such code in the presence of dynamically allocated memory, i.e., when the base pointer is unknown.
Representation
The masked symbol domain is based on finite sets of what we call masked symbols, which are pairs (s, m) consisting of the following components: We use finite sets of masked symbols to represent the elements of the masked symbol domain, that is, M ♯ = P(Sym × {0, 1, ⊤} n ).
Concretization
We now give a semantics to elements of the masked symbol domain. This semantics is parametrized w.r.t. valuations of the symbols. For the case where masked symbols represent partially known heap addresses, a valuation corresponds to one specific layout of the heap.
Technically, we define the concretization of elements x ♯ ∈ M ♯ w.r.t. a function λ : Sym → {0, 1} n that maps symbols to bit-vectors:
The function λ takes the role of the low initial state, for which we did not assume any specific structure in Section 4. Modeling λ as a mapping from symbols to bitvectors is a natural refinement to an initial state consisting of multiple components that are represented by different symbols.
Counting
We now show that the precise valuation of the symbols can be ignored for deriving upper bounds on number of observations that an adversary can make about a set of masked symbols. For this we conveniently interpret a symbol s as a vector of identical symbols (s, . . . , s), one per bit. 3 This allows us to apply the adversary's view (see Section 3) on masked symbols as the respective projection π to a subset of observable masked bits.
Given a set of masked symbols, we count the observations with respect to the adversary by applying π on the set's elements and taking the cardinality of the resulting set.
Example 4. The projection of the set
x ♯ = {(s, (0, 0, 1)), (t, (⊤, ⊤, 1)), (u, (1, 1, 1))} of (three bit) masked symbols to their two most significant bits yields the set {(0, 0), (t, t), (1, 1)}, i.e., we count three observations. However, the projection to their least significant bit yields only the singleton set {1}, i.e., the observation is determined by the masks alone.
The next proposition shows that counting the symbolic observations after projecting, as in Example 4, yields an upper bound for the range of the adversary's view, for any valuation of the symbols. We use this effect for static reasoning about cache-aware memory alignment. Proposition 1. For every x ♯ ∈ M ♯ , every valuation λ : Sym → {0, 1} n , and every projection π mapping vectors to a subset of their components, we have
Proof. This follows from the fact that equality of π on (s, m) and
, for all λ. To see this, assume there is a symbolic bit in π(s, m). Then we have s = s ′ , and hence λ(s) = λ(s ′ ). If there is no symbolic bit, the assertion follows immediately.
Update
We now describe the effect of Boolean and arithmetic operations on masked symbols. We focus on operations between pairs of masked symbols; the lifting of those operations to sets is obtained by performing the operations on all pairs of elements in their product. The update supports tracking information about known bits (which are encoded in the mask) and about the arithmetic relationship between symbols. We explain both cases below.
Tracking Masks
Cache-aware code often aligns data to the memory blocks of the underlying hardware.
Example 5. The following code snippet is produced when compiling the align function from Figure 3 with gcc -O2. The register EAX contains a pointer to a dynamically allocated heap memory location. 1 AND 0xFFFFFFC0, EAX 2 ADD 0x40, EAX
The first line ensures that the 6 least significant bits of that pointer are set to 0, thereby aligning it with cache lines of 64 bytes. The second line ensures that the resulting pointer points into the allocated region while keeping the alignment.
We support different Boolean operations and addition on masked symbols that enable us to analyze such code. The operations have the form
where the right-hand side denotes the inputs and the lefthand side the output of the operation. The operations are defined bit-wise as follows:
i.e., the abstract OP ♯ extends the concrete OP. Whenever m i or m ′ i is absorbing (i.e., 1 for OR and 0 for AND), we set m ′′ i to that value. In all other cases, we set m ′′ i = ⊤. The default is to introduce a fresh symbol for s ′′ , unless the logical operation acts neutral on all symbolic bits, in which case we can set s ′′ = s. This happens in two cases: first, if the operands' symbols coincide, i.e. s = s ′ ; second, if one operand is constant, i.e. m ′ ∈ {0, 1} n , and m i = ⊤ implies that m ′ i is neutral (i.e., 0 for OR and 1 for AND).
, 1}, i.e., the abstract XOR ♯ extends the concrete XOR. Whenever the symbols coincide, i.e. s = s ′ , we further set m ′′ i = 0, for all i with m i = m ′ i = ⊤. In all other cases, we set m ′′ i = ⊤. The default is to introduce a fresh symbol for s ′′ . We can avoid introducing a fresh symbol and set s ′′ = s in case one operand is a constant that acts neutral on each symbolic bit of the other, i.e., if m ′ ∈ {0, 1} n and if m i = ⊤ implies m ′ i = 0. OP = ADD: Starting from i = 0, 1, . . . , and as long as m i , m ′ i ∈ {0, 1}, we compute m ′′ i according to the standard definition of ADD 4 . As soon as we reach i with m i = ⊤ or m ′ i = ⊤, we set m ′′ j = ⊤ for all j ≥ i. The default is to use a fresh symbol s ′′ , unless one operand is a constant that acts neutral on the symbolic most-significant bits of the other, i.e., if m ′ ∈ {0, 1} n and for all j ≥ i, m j = ⊤ implies m ′ j = 0 and c j = 0; then we keep the symbol, i.e., s ′′ = s. OP = SUB: We compute SUB similarly to ADD, where the borrow bit takes the role of the carry bit. Here, we use the additional rule that whenever the symbols coincide, i.e. s = s ′ , we further set m ′′ i = 0, for all i with m i = m ′ i = ⊤. Example 6. Consider again Example 5 and assume that EAX initially has the symbolic value (s, ⊤). Executing Line 1 yields the masked symbol (s, (⊤ · · · ⊤000000)) ,
Executing Line 2, we obtain (s ′ , (⊤ · · · ⊤000000)), for a fresh s ′ . This masked symbol points to the beginning of some (unknown) cache line. In contrast, addition of 0x3F to (2) would yield (s, (⊤ · · · ⊤111111)), for which we can statically determine containment in the same cache line as (2).
Tracking Offsets
Control flow decisions in low-level code often rely on comparisons between pointers. For analyzing such code with sufficient precision, we need to keep track of their relative distance. Here, r points to a dynamic memory location. The loop terminates whenever pointer x reaches pointer y.
In this section we describe a mechanism that tracks the distance between masked symbols, and enables the analysis of comparisons, such as the one in Example 7.
Origins and Offsets Our mechanism is based on assigning to each masked symbol an origin and an offset from that origin. The origin of a symbol is the masked symbol from which it was derived by a sequence addition operations, and the offset tracks the cumulated effect of these operations. For convenience, we also define a partial inverse of orig and off describing the successor of an origin at a specific offset. We formalize this as a function succ : M × N → M ∪ {⊥} such that succ(orig(x), off (x)) = x.
Addition of Offsets
When performing an addition of a constant to a masked symbol, the mechanism first checks if there is already a masked symbol with the required offset. If such a symbol exists, it is reused. If not, the addition is carried out and memorized.
More precisely, the result of performing the addition y = ADD ♯ x, c of a masked symbol x ∈ M with a constant c ∈ {0, 1} n is computed as follows: Note that we restrict to the case in which one operand is a constant. In case both operands contain symbolic bits, for the result y (obtained according to Section 5.4.1) we set orig(y) = y and off (y) = 0.
Tracking Flag Values
Our analysis is performed at the level of disassembled x86 binary code, where inferring the status of CPU flags is crucial for determining the program's control flow. We support limited derivation of flag values; in particular, we determine the values of the zero (ZF) and carry flags (CF) as follows.
For the Boolean and addition operations described in Section 5.4.1, we determine the value of flag bits as follows:
• If at least one masked bit of the result is non-zero, then ZF = 0. • If the operation does not affect the (possibly symbolic) most-significant bits of the operands, then CF = 0. For comparison and subtraction operations, we rely on offsets for tracking their effect on flags. Specifically, for CMP ♯ x, y and SUB ♯ x, y, with source x and target y, we determine the value of flags as follows:
• If x = y, then ZF = 1;
• If orig(x) = orig(y) and off (x) = off (y) then ZF = 0;
In any other case, we assume that all combinations of flag values are possible.
Example 8. Consider again the code in Example 7. Termination of the loop is established by an instruction CMP x, y, followed by a conditional jump in case the zero flag is not set. In our analysis, we infer the value of the zero flag by comparing the offsets of x and y from their common origin r.
Memory Trace Abstract Domain
In this section, we present the memory trace domain, which is a data structure for representing the set of traces of possible memory accesses a program can make, and for computing the number of observations that the observers defined in Section 3.2 can make.
Representation
We use a directed acyclic graph (DAG) to compactly represent sets of traces of memory accesses. This generalizes a data structure that has been previously used for representing sets of traces of cache hits and misses [16] . A DAG t ♯ from the memory trace domain T ♯ is a tuple (V, E, r, L, R). The DAG has a set of vertices V representing program points, with a root r ∈ V and a set of edges E ⊆ V ×V representing transitions. We equip the DAG with a vertex labeling L : V → M ♯ that attaches to each vertex a set of masked symbols representing the memory locations that may have been accessed at this point, together with a repetition count R : V → P(N) that tracks the number of times each address has been accessed. During program analysis, we maintain and manipulate a single DAG, which is why we usually keep t ♯ implicit.
Concretization
Each vertex v in t ♯ corresponds to the set of traces of memory accesses performed by the program from the root up to this point of the analysis. This correspondence is formally given by a concretization function γ T ♯ λ that is parameterized by an instantiation λ : Sym → {0, 1} n of the masked symbols occurring in the labels (see Section 5), and is defined by:
where v 0 · · · v k , with v 0 = r and v k = v, ranges over all paths from r to v in t ♯ . That is, for each such path, the concretization contains the adversary's observations (given by the concretizations of the labels of its vertices) and their number (given by the repetition count).
Counting
We devise a counting procedure that over-approximates the number of observations different adversaries can make. The key feature of the procedure is that the bounds it delivers are independent of the instantiation of the symbols.
with cnt π (r) = 1. For the stuttering observers, we replace the factor |R(v)| from the expression in (3) by 1, which captures that those observers cannot distinguish between repetitions of accesses to the same unit.
Proposition 2. For all λ : Sym → {0, 1} n we have
Proof. cnt π (v) recursively sums over all paths from r to v and weights each vertex with the size of π applied to its label. From Proposition 1 it follows that this size is larger than the the number of concrete observations, regardless of how the symbols are instantiated. This yields the assertion.
Update and Join
The memory trace domain is equipped with functions for update and join, which govern how sets of traces are extended and merged, respectively. The update of an abstract element t ♯ receives a vertex v representing a set of traces of memory accesses, and it extends v by a new access to a potentially unknown address, represented by a set of masked symbols x ♯ ∈ M ♯ . Technically:
1. If the set of masked symbols is not a repetition (i.e. if L(v) = x ♯ ), the update function appends a new vertex v ′ to v (adding (v, v ′ ) to E), and it sets L(v ′ ) = x ♯ and R(v ′ ) = {1}.
2. Otherwise (i.e. if L(v) = x ♯ ), it increments the possible repetitions in R(v) by one.
The join for two vertices v 1 , v 2 first checks whether those vertices have the same parents and the same label, in which case v 1 is returned, and their repetitions are joined. Otherwise, a new vertex v ′ with L(v ′ ) = {ǫ} is generated and edges (v 1 , v ′ ) and (v 2 , v ′ ) are added to E. Implementation Issues To increase precision in counting and compactness of the representation, we apply the projection π when applying the update function, and we delay joins until the next update is performed. In this way we only maintain the information that is relevant for the final counting step and can encode accesses to the same block as stuttering. This is relevant, for example, when an if-statement fits into a single memory block. Figure 4 shows the corresponding DAGs for an addresstrace observer (Figure 4a ) and for a block-trace observer (Figure 4b) of the instruction cache. For both observers, the counting procedure reports two traces, i.e., a leak of 1 bit. For the stuttering block-trace observer, however, the counting procedure determines that there is only one possible observation. 
Soundness
In this section we establish the correctness of our approach. We split the argument in two parts. The first part explains how we establish leakage bounds w.r.t. all valuations of low variables. The second part explains the correctness of the abstract domains introduced in Section 5 and Section 6.
Global Soundness and Leakage Bounds
We formalize the correctness of our approach based on established notions of local and global soundness [14] , which we slightly extend to cater for the introduction of fresh symbols during analysis.
For this, we distinguish between the symbols in Sym lo ⊆ Sym that represent the low initial state and those in Sym \ Sym lo that are introduced during the analysis. A low initial state in I lo is given in terms of a valuation of low symbols λ : Sym lo → {0, 1} n . When introducing a fresh symbol s (see Section 5), we need to extend the domain of λ to include s. We denote by Ext(λ) the set of all functionsλ with λ ↾ dom(λ) = λ, dom(λ) ⊆ Sym, and ran(λ) = {0, 1} n .
With this, we formally define the global soundness of the fixpoint Col ♯ of the abstract transition function next ♯ as follows:
Equation (4) ensures that for all low initial states λ, every trace of the program is included in a concretization of the symbolic fixpoint, for some valuationλ of the symbols that have been introduced during analysis.
The existence ofλ is sufficient to prove our central result, which is a bound for the leakage w.r.t. all low initial states. 
The statement follows because set inclusion of the fixpoints implies set inclusion of the projection to memory traces: view (Col λ ) ⊆ view (γλ(Col ♯ )). The memory trace of the abstract fixpoint is given by view (γ T ♯ λ (v)), and Proposition 2 shows that cnt π (v) delivers an upper bound, for anȳ λ.
Local Soundness
We say that an abstract domain is locally sound if the abstract next ♯ operator over-approximates the effect of the concrete next operator (here: in terms of set inclusion). Formally we require that, for all abstract elements a ♯ , ∀λ, ∃λ ∈ Ext(λ) : next γ λ (a ♯ ) ⊆ γλ(next ♯ (a ♯ )) . (5) From Local to Global Soundness It is a fundamental result from abstract interpretation [14] that local soundness (5) implies global soundness (4) . When the fixpoint is reached in a finite number of steps, this result immediately follows for our modified notions of soundness, by induction on the number of steps. This is sufficient for the development in our paper; we leave an investigation of the general case to future work Local Soundness in CacheAudit It remains to show the local soundness of abstract transfer function next ♯ . In our case, this function is inherited from the CacheAudit static analyzer [16] , and it is composed of several independent and locally sound abstract domains. For details on how these domains are wired together, refer to [16] .
Here, we focus on proving local soundness conditions for the two components we developed in this paper, namely the masked symbol and the memory trace domains.
Masked Symbol Domain
The following lemma states the local soundness of the Masked Symbol Domain, following (5):
Lemma 1 (Local Soundness of Masked Symbol Domain).
For all operands OP ∈ {AND, OR, XOR, ADD, SUB}, we have
Proof. For the proof, we consider two cases:
• the operation preserves the symbol. Then the abstract update coincides with the concrete update, withλ = λ and next γ M ♯ λ (a ♯ ) = γ M ♯ λ (next ♯ (a ♯ )). This is because the abstract operations are defined such that the symbol is only preserved when we can guarantee that the operation acts neutral on all symbolic bits.
• the operation introduces a fresh symbol s ′′ . Then we simply defineλ(s ′′ ) such thatλ(s ′′ ) ⊙ m ′′ = OP ♯ (λ(s) ⊙ m,λ(s ′ ) ⊙ m ′ ). This is possible because the concrete bits in m ′′ coincide with the operation, and the symbolic bits can be set as required byλ. Flag values are correctly approximated as all flag-value combinations are considered as possible unless the values can be exactly determined.
Memory Trace Domain
The following lemma states the soundness of the memory trace domain:
Lemma 2 (Local Soundness of Memory Trace Domain).
∀λ, ∃λ ∈ Ext(λ)
:
Proof. The local soundness of the memory trace domains follows directly because the update does not perform any abstraction with respect to the sets of masked symbols it appends; it just yields a more compact representation in case of repetitions of the same observation.
Case Study
This section presents a case study, which leverages the techniques developed in this paper for the first rigorous analysis of a number of practical countermeasures against cache side channel attacks on modular exponentiation algorithms. The countermeasures are from releases of the cryptographic libraries libgcrypt and OpenSSL from April 2013 to March 2016. We report on results for bits of leakage to the adversary models presented in Section 3.2 (i.e., the logarithm of the maximum number of observations the adversaries can make, see Section 4), due to instruction-cache (I-cache) accesses and data-cache (D-cache) accesses. 5 As the adversary models are ordered according to their observational capabilities, this sheds light into the level of provable security offered by different protections.
Analysis Tool
We implement the novel abstract domains described in Sections 5 and 6 on top of the CacheAudit open source static analyzer [16] . CacheAudit provides infrastructure for parsing, control-flow reconstruction, and fixed point computation. Our novel domains extend the scope of CacheAudit by providing support for (1) the analysis of dynamically allocated memory, and for (2) adversaries who can make finegrained observations about memory accesses. The source code is publicly available 6 . For all considered instances, our analysis takes between 0 and 4 seconds on a t1.micro virtual machine instance on Amazon EC2.
Target Implementations
The target of our experiments are different side-channel countermeasures for modular exponentiation, which we analyse at x86 binary level. Our testbed consists of Cimplementations of ElGamal decryption [18] with 3072-bit keys, using 6 different implementations of modular exponentiation, which we compile using gcc 4.8.4, on a 32-bit Linux machine. We use the ElGamal implementation from the libgcrypt 1.6.3 library, in which we replace the source code for modular exponentiation (mpi-pow.c) with implementations containing countermeasures from different versions of libgcrypt and OpenSSL. For libgcrypt, we consider versions 1.5.2 and 1.5.3, which implement square-and-multiply modular exponentiation, as well as versions 1.6.1 and 1.6.3, which implement sliding-window modular exponentiation. Versions 1.5.2 and 1.6.1 do not implement a dedicated countermeasure against cache attacks. For OpenSSL, we consider versions 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g, which implement fixed-window modular exponentiation with two different countermeasures against cache attacks. We integrate the countermeasures into the libgcrypt 1.6.3-implementation of modular exponentiation.
The current version of CacheAudit supports only a subset of the x86 instruction set, which we extended with instructions required for this case study. To bound the required extensions, we focus our analysis on the regions of the executables that were targeted by exploits and to which the corresponding countermeasures were applied, rather than the whole executables. As a consequence, the formal statements we derive only hold for those regions. In particular, we do not analyze the code of the libgcrypt's multi-precision integer multiplication and modulo routines, and we specify that the output of the memory allocation functions (e.g. malloc) is symbolic (see Section 5).
Square-and-Multiply Modular Exponentiation
The first target of our analysis is modular exponentiation by square-and-multiply [35] . The algorithm is depicted in Figure 5 and is implemented, e.g., in libgcrypt version 1.5.2. Line 5 of the algorithm contains a conditional branch whose condition depends on a bit of the secret exponent. An attacker who can observe the victim's accesses to instruction or data caches may learn which branch was taken and identify the value of the exponent bit. This weakness has been shown to be vulnerable to key-recovery attacks based on prime+probe [32, 49] and flush+reload [47] .
In response to these attacks, libgcrypt 1.5.3 implements a countermeasure that makes sure that the squaring operation is always performed, see Figure 6 for the pseudocode. It is noticeable that this implementation still contains a conditional branch that depends on the bits of the exponent in Lines 7-8, namely the copy operation that selects the outcome of both multiplication operations. However, this has been considered a minor problem because the branch is small and is expected to fit into the same cache line as preceding and following code, or to be always loaded in cache due to speculative execution [47] . In the following, we apply the techniques developed in this paper to analyze whether the expectations on memory layout are met. 7 1 r := 1 2 for i := |e| − 1 downto 0 do 
Results
The results of our analysis are given in Figure 7 and Figure 8 . (a) Compiled with the default gcc optimization level -O2. Regardless whether the jump is taken or not, first block 41a80 is accessed, followed by block 41aa0. This results in a 0-bit b-block-leak.
(b) Compiled with gcc optimization level -O0. The memory block 5d060 is only accessed when the jump is taken. This results in a 1-bit b-block-leak. Figure 9 : Layout of libgcrypt 1.5.3 executables with 32-byte memory blocks (black lines denote block boundaries). The highlighted code corresponds to the conditional branching in lines 7-8 in Figure 6 . The red region corresponds to the executed instructions in the if-branch. The blue curve points to the jump target, where the jump is taken if the if-condition does not hold.
• Our analysis identifies a 1-bit data cache leak in squareand-multiply exponentiation (line 2 in Figure 7a ), due to memory accesses in the conditional branch in that implementation. Our analysis confirms that this data cache leak is closed by square-and-always-multiply (line 2 in Figure 7b ).
• Line 1 of Figures 7a and Figure 7b show that both implementations leak through instruction cache to powerful adversaries who can see each access to the instruction cache. However, for weaker, stuttering block-trace (b-block) observers that cannot distinguish between repeated accesses to a block, square-and-always-multiply does not leak, confirming the intuition that the conditional copy operation is indeed less problematic than the conditional multiplication.
• The comparison between Figure 7b and Figure 8 demonstrates that the effectiveness of countermeasures can depend on details such as cache line size and compilation strategy. This is illustrated in Figure 9 , which shows that more aggressive compilation leads to more compact code that fits into single cache lines. The same effect is observable for data caches, where more aggressive compilation avoids data cache accesses altogether. Figure 10 : Table lookup from libgcrypt 1.6.1. Variable e0 represents the window, right-shifted by 1. The lookup returns a pointer to the first limb of the multi-precision integer in base u, and the number of limbs in base u size. The first branch deals with powers of 1 by returning pointers to the base.
Windowed Modular Exponentiation
In this section we analyze windowed algorithms for modular exponentiation [35] . These algorithms differ from algorithms based on square-and-multiply in that they process multiple exponent bits in one shot. For this they commonly rely on tables filled with pre-computed powers of the base. For example, for moduli of 3072 bits, libgcrypt 1.6.1 precomputes 7 multi-precision integers and handles the power 1 in a branch, see Figure 10 . Each pre-computed value requires 384 bytes of storage, which amounts to 6 or 7 memory blocks in architectures with cache lines of 64 bytes. Key-dependent accesses to those tables can be exploited for mounting cache side channel attacks [32] .
We consider three countermeasures, which are commonly deployed to defend against this vulnerability. They have in common that they all copy the table entries instead of returning a pointer to the entry. Figure 11 : A defensive routine for array lookup with a constant sequence of memory accesses, as implemented in libgcrypt 1.6.3.
• The first countermeasure ensures that in the copy process, a constant sequence of memory locations is accessed, see Figure 11 for pseudocode. The expression on line 7 ensures that only the k-th pre-computed value is actually copied to r. This countermeasure is implemented, e.g. in NaCl and libgcrypt 1.6.3.
• The second countermeasure stores pre-computed values in such a way that the i-th byte of all pre-computed values resides in the same memory block. This ensures that when the pre-computed values are retrieved, a constant sequence of memory blocks will be accessed. This so-called scatter/gather technique is described in detail in Section 2, with code in Figure 3 , and is deployed, e.g. in OpenSSL 1.0.2f.
• The third countermeasure is a variation of scatter/gather, and ensures that the gather-procedure performs a constant sequence of memory accesses (see Figure 12 ). This countermeasure was recently introduced in OpenSSL 1.0.2g, as a response to the CacheBleed attack, where the adversary can use cache-bank conflicts to make finer-grained observations and recover the pre-computed values despite scatter/gather. For example, the pre-computed values in Figure 2 will be distributed to different cache banks as shown in Figure 13 , and cache-bank adversaries can distinguish between accesses to p 0 , . . . , p 3 and p 4 , . . . , p 7 . Results Our analysis of the different versions of the table lookup yields the following results 8 :
• Figure 14a shows the results of the analysis of the unprotected table lookup in Figure 10 . The leakage of one bit for most adversaries is explained by the fact that they can observe which branch is taken. The layout of the conditional branch is demonstrated in Figure 15a ; lowering the optimization level results in a different layout (see Figure 15b ), and in this case our analysis shows that the I-Cache b-block-leak is eliminated.
• Figure 14a also shows that more powerful adversaries that can see the exact address can learn log 2 7 = 2.8 bits per access. The static analysis is not precise enough to determine that the lookups are correlated, hence it reports that at most 5.6 bits are leaked. • Figure 14b shows that the defensive copying strategy from libgcrypt 1.6.3 (see Figure 11 ) eliminates all leakage to the cache.
• Figure 14c shows that the scatter/gather copyingstrategy eliminates leakage for any adversary that can observe memory accesses at the granularity of memory blocks, and this constitutes the first proof of security of this countermeasure. For adversaries that can see the full address-trace, our analysis reports a 3-bit leakage for each memory access, which is again accumulated over correlated lookups because of imprecisions in the static analysis.
• Our analysis is able to detect the leak leading to the CacheBleed attack [48] against scatter/gather. The leak is visible when comparing the results of the analysis in Figure 14c with respect to address-trace and block-trace adversaries, however, its severity may be over-estimated due to the powerful address-trace observer. For a more accurate analysis of this threat, we repeat the analysis for the banktrace D-cache observer. The analysis results in 384-bit leak, which corresponds to one bit leak per memory access, accumulated for each accessed byte due to analysis imprecision (see above). The one-bit leak in the i-th memory access is explained by the ability of this observer to distinguish between the two banks within which the i-th byte of all pre-computed values fall.
• Figure 14d shows that defensive gather from OpenSSL 1.0.2g (see Figure 12 ) eliminates all leakage to cache.
Discussion
A number of comments are in order when interpreting the bounds delivered by our analysis.
(a) Compiled with the default gcc optimization level -O2. If the jump is taken, first block 4b980, followed by block 4ba40, followed by 4b980 again. If the branch is not taken, only block 4b980 is accessed.
(b) Compiled with gcc optimization level -O1. Regardless whether the jump is taken or not, first block 47dc0 is accessed, followed by block 47e00. Figure 15 : Layout of executables using libgcrypt 1.6.1. The highlighted code corresponds to a conditional branch (blue: if-branch, red: else-branch). Curves represent jump targets.
Use of Upper Bounds
The results we obtain are upper bounds on the leaked information. Results of zero leakage present a proof of the absence of leaks. Positive leakage bounds, however, are not necessarily tight and do not correspond to proofs of the presence of leaks. The reason for this is that the amount of leaked information may be overestimated due to imprecision of the static analysis, as is the case with the D-Cache leak shown on Figure 14c .
Use of Imperfect Models The guarantees we deliver are only valid to the extent to which the models used accurately capture the aspects of the execution platform relevant to known attacks. A recent empirical study of OS-level side channels on different platforms [11] shows that advanced microarchitectural features may interfere with the cache, which can render countermeasures ineffective.
Alternative Attack Targets In our analysis, we assume that heap addresses returned by malloc are low values. For analyzing scenarios in which the heap addresses themselves are the target of cache attacks (e.g., when the goal is to reduce the entropy of ASLR [25] ), heap addresses would need to be modeled as high data.
Performance of Countermeasures
We conclude the case study by considering the effect of the different countermeasures on the performance of modular exponentiation. For the target implementations (see Section 8.2), we measure performance as the clock count (b) Only multi-precision-integer retrieval step. Figure 16 : Performance measurements for libgcrypt 1.6.3 ElGamal decryption, for 3072-bit keys.
(through the rdtsc instruction), as well as the number of performed instructions (through the PAPI library [37] ), for performing exponentiations, for a sample of random bases and exponents. We make 100,000 measurements with an Intel Q9550 CPU. Figure 16a summarizes our measurements. The results show that the applied countermeasure for square and multiply causes a significant slow-down of the exponentiation. A smaller slow-down is observed with sliding-window countermeasures as well; this slow-down is demonstrated in Figure 16b , which shows the performance of the retrieval of precomputed values, with different countermeasures applied.
Related Work
We begin by discussing approaches that tackle related goals, before we discuss approaches that rely on similar techniques.
Transforming out Timing Leaks Agat proposes a program transformation for removing control-flow timing leaks by equalizing branches of conditionals with secret guards [2] , which he complements with an informal discussion of the effect of instruction and data caches in Java byte code [3] . Molnar et al. [36] propose a program transformation that eliminates control-flow timing leaks, together with a static check for the resulting x86 executables. Coppens et al. [12] propose a similar transformation and evaluate its practicality. The definitions in Section 3 encompass the adversary model of [36] , but also weaker ones; they could be used as a target for program transformations that allow for limited forms for secret-dependent behavior.
Constant-time Software Constant-time code defeats timing attacks by ensuring that control flow, memory accesses, and execution time of individual instructions do not depend on secret data. Constant-time code is the current gold standard for defensive implementations of cryptographic algorithms [9] .
A number of program analyses support verifying constanttime implementations. Almeida et al. [5] develop an approach based on self-composition that checks absence of timing leaks in C-code; Almeida et al. [4] provide a tool chain for verifying constaint-time properties of LLVM IR code. Similar to the dynamic analysis by Langley [31], our approach targets executable code, thereby avoiding potential leaks introduced by the compiler [26] . Moreover, it supports verification of more permissive interactions between soft-ware and hardware -at the price of stronger assumptions about the underlying hardware platform.
Quantitative Information Flow Analysis Technically, our work draws on methods from quantitative information-flow analysis (QIF) [10] , where the automation by reduction to counting problems appears in [7, 38] , and has subsequently been refined in several dimensions [13, 24, 28, 30] .
Specifically, our work builds on CacheAudit [16] , a tool for the static quantification of cache side channels in x86 executables. The techniques developed in this paper extend CacheAudit with support for precise reasoning about dynamically allocated memory, and a rich set of novel adversary models. Together, this enables the first formal analysis of widely deployed countermeasures, such as scatter/gather.
Abstract Interpretation
We rely on basic notions from abstract interpretation [14] for establishing the soundness of our analysis. However, the connections run deeper: For example, the observers we define (including the stuttering variants [21] ) can be seen as abstractions in the classic sense, which enables composition of their views in algebraic ways [15] . Abstract interpretation has also been used for analyzing information flow properties [6, 20] . Reuse of the machinery developed in these papers could help streamline our reasoning. We leave a thorough exploration of this connection to future work.
Conclusions
In this paper we devise novel techniques that provide support for bit-level and arithmetic reasoning about pointers in the presence of dynamic memory allocation. These techniques enable us to perform the first rigorous analysis of widely deployed software countermeasures against cache side-channel attacks on modular exponentiation, based on executable code.
